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United States v. Lancaster. The Fourth Circuit Reverses
Course on Jury Voir Dire in "Swearing Contest" Cases
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of
mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of
appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no
particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient
and artificial formula.!
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees every criminal defendant the right to trial "by an
impartial jury.",2 As a consequence of this constitutional mandate,
individuals with preconceived biases3 that would adversely affect
*their assessment of a criminal defendant's case are not allowed to
serve as jurors in the case.4 One such impermissible bias is the belief
that more credibility should be ascribed to a police officer's
testimony than to the testimony of other witnesses merely because of
the officer's status as a law enforcement official.5
1. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936) (opinion by Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .... ." Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted that parties in a
civil case also are entitled to an impartial jury. See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802
F.2d 1532, 1535 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The civil litigant's right to an impartial jury inheres
in the seventh amendment's preservation of a 'right to trial by jury' and the fifth
amendment's guarantee of due process.").
3. A preconceived bias would be a bias in favor of or a prejudice against a party
developed prior to trial.
4. See E. Maurice Braswell, Voir Dire-Use and Abuse, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
49, 52-53 (1970). Jurors must base their verdict solely "upon the evidence developed at
the triaL" Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,722 (1961) (emphasis added).
5. See United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 870-71 (6th Cir. 1992). One district
judge's instruction to prospective jurors succinctly summarized this rule:
People who are involved in law enforcement do not get any special treatment in
Court. They are not automatically entitled, in other words, to be believed
simply and purely because they are engaged in law enforcement as a profession.
They are to be listened to, evaluated and judged by the same standards as
anyone else, any other witness that comes into Court is expected to be looked at
in the same fashion.
Iti; see also United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 755 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting
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One of the procedural safeguards developed to uncover
impermissible biases and assure juror impartiality is the voir dire
examination of prospective jurors.6 During voir dire in federal court,
either the judge or the attorneys representing each side7 ask jurors
questions to determine whether they might harbor some prejudice or
bias that could affect their determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. Based largely on juror responses, judges determine if
certain jurors should be dismissed for cause,9 and the parties decide
whether they should exercise their peremptory challenges and have
approvingly from a trial court's jury instruction that stated that "[t]he testimony of
government agents is to be subjected to the same tests and given the same consideration
as that of any other witness," and that "[n]o more and no less weight is to be given their
testimony simply because of their official capacity with the government").
6. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,431 (1991) (plurality opinion); McDonough
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984); Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion); King v. Jones, 824 F.2d 324, 326 (4th
Cir. 1987); William H. Levit et al., Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL.
L. REV. 916, 923 (1971).
7. In federal criminal trials, "[t]he court may permit the defendant or the
defendant's attorney and the attorney for the government to conduct the examination of
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination." FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
Similarly, in federal civil trials, "[t]he court may permit the parties or their attorneys to
conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination."
FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a). In most federal district courts judges commonly conduct voir dire.
See JAMES J. GOBERT, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING
A JURY 325 (2d ed. 1990).
8. See United States v. Brown, 799 F.2d 134, 135 (4th Cir. 1986) (" '[The] essential
function of voir dire is to allow for the impaneling of a fair and impartial jury through
questions which permit the intelligent exercise of challenges by counsel."'" (quoting
United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 155 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v.
Anderson, 562 F.2d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1977)))); Neal Bush, The Case for Expansive Voir
Dire, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 9, 9 (1976) ("Questioning of potential jurors is conducted
because it is thought to be the best forum within the courtroom for determining a
potential juror's prejudices and the extent and intensity of those prejudices."). One
commentator has stated:
The theoretical purpose of voir dire is to determine the state of the jurors' minds
so that a fair and impartial jury can be chosen. For counsel to be able to
exercise an informed challenge to a juror, either for cause or peremptorily, it is
essential to have as much knowledge as possible of all matters which might
compromise the juror's impartiality.
GOBERT, supra note 7, at 324.
9. If a juror evidences "a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis
of partiality" during voir dire, he has shown cause for his removal. Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
For example, an individual who is biased against the defendant's race must be disqualified
from serving on the jury. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1931); cf.
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973) (stating that, under certain
circumstances, the court is required to ask potential jurors about their racial biases, thus
implying that jurors will be removed for cause if biases are determined). An individual
who is prejudiced against the defendant's religion also must be dismissed for cause. See
Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314-15.
JURY VOIR DIRE
prospective jurors removed from the case."0
In a criminal case in which jurors are likely to decide the
defendant's guilt or innocence based upon whether they believe the
testimony of the defendant or the testimony of a police officer, the
defendant would obviously benefit from knowing whether a juror
believes that police officers are automatically due more credibility
than other witnesses. If a juror reveals that he holds such a belief, he
must be dismissed from the case for cause; if the defendant merely
suspects that the juror holds this belief, the defendant can
peremptorily strike the juror." The defendant therefore may try to
ascertain whether any prospective jurors-referred to as members of
the venire-are impermissibly biased toward police testimony by
asking them directly during voir dire whether they believe police to
be inherently more credible than other witnesses.
Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Lancaster," if a criminal defendant requested that a judge ask jurors
whether they would lend more credibility to a police officer than
other witnesses merely because of his status as a police officer, and
the judge declined to ask members of the venire that question, the
case would be analyzed under a two-tiered standard enunciated by
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Evans.13 The standard required
the court of appeals to determine initially whether jurors would
10. Peremptory challenges allow a party to have a juror removed without stating a
reason for excusing the juror; this form of challenge "permits rejection for real or
imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable." Swain, 380 U.S. at 202
(citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). The Supreme Court has noted that the
peremptory challenge "is often exercised upon the 'sudden impressions and
unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of
another.'" Id. (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)). In federal
criminal cases, the number of peremptory challenges a party may exercise depends on the
severity of the offense with which the defendant is charged. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b).
The defendant is entitled to twenty such challenges in death penalty cases, ten challenges
for cases in which the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, and
three challenges in all other cases involving imprisonment or fine. See iL In federal civil
cases, each party is entitled to three peremptory challenges. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994).
For a discussion of peremptory challenges, see generally Richard L. Link, Annotation,
Number of and Procedure for Exercising Peremptory Challenges Allowed in Federal
Criminal Trial for Selection of Regular Jurors-Modern Cases, 110 A.L.R. FED. 626
(1992).
11. See Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 545 (1964) (holding that the failure to
inquire as to potential jurors' biases, which "might have supplied defense counsel ... with
relevant and useful information for exercising peremptory challenges or challenges for
cause," was reversible error).
12. 96 F.3d 734,736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 967 (1997).
13. 917 F.2d 800, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Lancaster, 96
F.3d 734,736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
decide the case on the basis of whether they believed the testimony
of a police officer or the testimony of a criminal defendant.14 If the
case rested on such a choice, and the judge declined to question
jurors as to possible biases in favor of police testimony, the Fourth
Circuit held that the judge abused his discretion and committed per
se error." After reaching the conclusion that the trial court had
erred, the court of appeals was required to consider four factors to
determine if the error warranted reversal of the defendant's
conviction." Under this second tier of the Evans standard, the court
was instructed to consider (1) the importance of the officer's
testimony to the case as a whole; (2) whether during voir dire and in
instructions to the jury the judge satisfactorily covered the
impropriety of lending a police officer's testimony more credit than
the testimony of other witnesses; (3) the extent to which the officer's
credibility was put into issue during the trial; and (4) the extent to
which any other, non-law enforcement witnesses corroborated the
officer's testimony. 7 This was the standard under which a panel of
three judges from the Fourth Circuit initially reviewed United States
v. Lancaster.8
Only six months later, however, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en
banc, overruled Evans and vacated the initial decision on appeal in
Lancaster.19 Concerned that the Evans standard did not give trial
courts an appropriate amount of discretion in the conduct of voir
dire,2 and that Evans might transform voir dire into unnecessarily
lengthy sessions in which the trial court would feel obligated to ask
jurors whether they would give greater credibility to the testimony of
"any identifiable class of witnesses that might conceivably be thought
by jurors to be inherently credible, '1 the court set forth a new
standard of review for "swearing contest" cases.' Under the new
standard, a trial judge does not automatically abuse his discretion if
14. See ia.
15. See id.; see also Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 740 (interpreting Evans as holding that
"when the Government's case depends wholly on the testimony of law enforcement
agents," the judge's refusal to ask the question was, "without more, an abuse of
discretion" (emphasis added)).
16. See Evans, 917 F.2d at 807.
17. See id. at 808.
18. 78 F.3d 888, 892-96 (4th Cir.), vacated, 96 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 967 (1997).
19. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 736.
20. See Id. at 740-41.
21. Id. at 741.
22. See id at 742.
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he declines to ask prospective jurors whether they would credit
testimony from police more than testimony from other witnesses,
even when the government's case depends solely on police
testimony.' Instead, the defendant must demonstrate that the court
abused its discretion by showing that the voir dire as a whole was not
"reasonably sufficient to probe the prospective jurors for bias and
partiality.
' 24
This Note reviews the facts of Lancastere and analyzes the
Fourth Circuit's initial opinion in the case and its subsequent
opinion en banc.Y Next, the Note considers the decisions preceding
Lancaster, including Evans.' The Note examines the Fourth Circuit's
holding in light of Supreme Court precedent, decisions from other
circuits,3 and legal scholarship concerning voir dire.3' Finally, this
Note considers the implications of the Lancaster decision.32
The two appellants in United States v. Lancaster were Bert
Lancaster and Derrick Vanlierop, federal prisoners at Lorton
Reformatory in northern Virginia.33 On May 14, 1994, they were
involved in an altercation with a third prisoner, Aaron Davis, and a
prison guard, Corporal Lloyd Staggs' As a result of the incident,
Lancaster and Vanlierop were charged .with assault resulting in
serious bodily injury and illegally possessing a shank.35 Additionally,
the government charged Vanlierop with assaulting a correctional
officer.i
The government based its case primarily on the testimony of
Corporal Staggs, who testified that during a recreational period for
the Lorton inmates, Lancaster attacked Davis with a shank.37
23. See id. at 74041.
24. Id. at 742.
25. See infra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 73-99 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 100-93 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 194-206 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 207-26 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 236-44 and accompanying text.
33. See United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 890 (4th Cir.), vacated, 96 F.3d 734,
736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 967 (1997).
34. Seeid
35. See id A "shank," as defined by the relevant law in this case, is "a knife,
instrument, tool, or other thing not authorized by [prison officials] which is capable of
causing death or bodily injury." VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-203(4) (Michie 1994).
36. See Lancaster, 78 F.3d at 891.
37. See id. at 890. Corporal Staggs alone accompanied a group of ten inmates into a
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Corporal Staggs stated that he attempted to restrain Lancaster but
was prevented from doing so by Vanlierop, who threatened the
prison guard with another shank.' According to Corporal Staggs,
Lancaster then continued his attack on Davis, and Vanlierop moved
closer to the fight.39 At that point, the prison guard radioed for help,
and other guards arrived shortly thereafter, restoring order.'
On cross-examination, the defense attacked Corporal Staggs's
credibility, questioning him regarding instances of misconduct
reported in his personnel file.4' The defendants then offered a
version of the events of May 14 that differed considerably from
Corporal Staggs's testimony. Vanlierop testified that both he and
Lancaster acted in self-defense. 42 According to Vanlierop, Davis, not
Lancaster, was the aggressor, attacking Lancaster with a shank, and
stabbing him in the eye and neck.43 Vanlierop stated that Lancaster
then acted in self-defense, injuring Davis.44 Vanlierop also testified
that he did not threaten Corporal Staggs but did grab a shank from
Lancaster and use it to defend Lancaster and himself from the other
inmates until more prison guards arrived.45
prison yard for a recreational period. See idU All ten inmates were handcuffed together in
pairs, see id, although Vanlierop and Lancaster were not in the same pair, see idt at 890
n.1. The fight broke out as Staggs was attempting to remove the handcuffs. See id. at 890.
3& See id Corporal Staggs testified that Vanlierop forced him to release Lancaster,
whereupon Lancaster resumed his attack on Davis. See id Staggs also stated that
Vanlierop demanded the keys to the handcuffs. See id.
39. See id at 892.
40. See id. One other prison guard, Lieutenant Teixeira, testified. See id at 891.
Teixeira stated that he saw Vanlierop attempting to leave the area of the fight, holding a
shank. See id Teixeira testified that he threatened to spray Vanlierop with mace, at
which point Vanlierop dropped the shank. See id Teixeira then subdued and handcuffed
the prisoner with the assistance of Corporal Staggs. See id.
41. See id at 890. Specifically, the court noted that the defendants had questioned
Staggs about a citation for
improperly allowing inmates access to an area where keys were stored; a citation
for mishandling keys; a citation for engaging in "horseplay" with inmates; a
citation for negligence in the performance of a count of inmates; a
recommendation that Corporal Staggs's employment be terminated; and a
citation for lack of dependability.
Id Government witness Lieutenant Teixeira testified that he had a favorable opinion of
Corporal Staggs but admitted that Staggs "tends sometimes to take things too lightly." Id.
at 891.
42. See id at 891. Lancaster chose not to testify at the trial. See id at 892 n.3.
43. See id. at 891. Vanlierop said that because he and Lancaster were both from New
York, they were subjected to harassment from the other inmates at Lorton, many of
whom were from Washington, D.C. See id According to Vanlierop, this animosity





Thus, the principal evidence concerning the details of the fight
consisted of the conflicting testimony of a prison guard and an
inmate. The defendants believed that the verdict would depend
largely on which of these two witnesses the jury chose to believe.'
Accordingly, the defendants requested that the district judge, who
elected to conduct the pretrial examination of the venire personally,47
ask prospective jurors the following question during voir dire: "'Do
any of you believe that a guard at Lorton, a police officer, or a
member of the F.B.I. is more worthy of belief than any other citizen
of our community?' " The judge, however, refused to ask this
question.49
While the judge did not pose the defendants' question to the
venire, he did ask some general questions to test the jurors for bias.
He asked the jurors if they had friends or relatives in law
enforcement and whether that association would make it difficult for
them to render an impartial verdict.' He further asked if any of the
potential jurors had worked in law enforcement and whether that
would predispose them to favor the prosecution in the case."1 The
46. See id. at 892.
47. See id.; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the judge's role in
conducting voir dire).
48. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 738 (quoting the defendant's proposed question to venire
members). The court noted that
[a]ppellants maintain that the trial amounted to a "swearing contest" between
Vanlierop and Corporal Staggs on the issue-critical to the defense theory that
Lancaster acted in self-defense and Vanlierop merely assisted Lancaster-of
whether Lancaster attacked Davis or vice versa, and that knowledge of bias in
favor of law enforcement officers based solely on their status as law enforcement
officers was vital to the intelligent exercise of challenges to the venire.
Lancaster, 78 F.3d at 892.
49. See Lancaster, 78 F.3d at 891. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
24(a), if a federal judge opts to conduct voir dire, "the court shall permit the defendant or
the defendant's attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement the
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the
prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems
proper." FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (emphasis added). The rule in civil cases is essentially
the same. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a).
50. See Lancaster, 78 F.3d at 894. The judge asked specifically, " 'Do you think that
the fact that you have so many family members in law enforcement would make it
difficult for you to be impartial in this case?'" Id. (quoting the district court's question to
venire members). He also asked, "'Do you feel that those relationships would make it
difficult for you to be impartial in this case? ... I notice a little hesitation. Do you sort of
think that you might be tilted in favor of law-enforcement witnesses in this case?'" Id.
(quoting the district court's question to venire members).
51. See id. The trial court inquired," 'Would [employment by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms] make it difficult for you to be impartial in this case? ... Would
you feel that you would be somewhat predisposed towards favoring the prosecution? ...
1997]
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judge also inquired as to whether the jurors might be biased against
the defendants because Lancaster and Vanlierop were inmates."
Finally, he asked whether the venire members could think of "'any
reason.., anything at all.., that would make it difficult for you to sit
as an impartial juror in this case.' "" During the trial, the judge
specifically addressed the jury's determinations of witness credibility
only once, when he gave jury instructions,' and he did not refer to
the potential problem of the jury's lending undue credibility to prison
guard testimony at that time.
The jury convicted the defendants, who subsequently appealed
the verdict to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.5 The
defendants argued that the case was controlled by the Fourth
[W]ould [employment as a parole officer] make it difficult for you to be completely
impartial in this case?'" d. (alterations in original) (quoting district court's questions to
venire members).
52. See id.
53. Id. (quoting the district court's question to venire members).
54. See id. at 895. The judge's instruction on credibility was as follows:
"Now, in the case before you today, one of the most important areas you are
going to have to work on is the credibility of witnesses ....
You, as jurors, are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of each
of the witnesses called to testify in this case, and only you determine the
importance that their testimony deserves....
In making your assessment, you should carefully evaluate all the
testimony given, the circumstances under which each witness has testified and
every matter in evidence which tends to show whether a witness in your opinion
is worthy of belief.
Consider each witness' intelligence, motive to falsify, state of mind and
appearance and manner while on the witness stand.
Consider the witness' ability to observe the matters as to which he has
testified and consider whether he impresses you as having accurate memory of
the matters about which he testified.
Consider also any relation that a witness may bear to either side of the
case, the manner in which each witness might be affected by your verdict and
the extent to which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted by
other evidence in the case.
Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness or between
the testimony of different witnesses may or may not cause you to disbelieve or
discredit such testimony.
Two or more persons witnessing an incident or a transaction may simply
see or hear it differently. Innocent misrecollection, like failure of recollection, is
not an uncommon human experience. In weighing the effect of a discrepancy,
however, always consider whether the discrepancy pertains to a matter of
importance or to an insignificant detail and consider whether the discrepancy
results from innocent error or from intentional falsehood.
After making your judgment concerning the believability of a witness, you
can then attach such importance to that testimony, if any, that you feel it
deserves."
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting the district court's jury instructions on credibility).
55. See id. at 890.
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Circuit's holding in United States v. Evans56 because the case
amounted to a credibility contest between a government official,
Corporal Staggs, and a criminal defendant, prisoner Vanlierop.'
Under Evans, the defendants argued, it was per se error for the trial
court not to ask jurors whether they would lend more credibility to
the prison guard merely because of his status as a government
official.58 The court agreed with the defendants, holding that the trial
court had committed an error.59
Yet, the court noted, Evans did not stand for the proposition
that the trial court's error always required reversal.' Instead,
according to the Lancaster court, Evans held that an appellate court
must consider several factors before making a decision on whether to
reverse the lower court: (1) the importance of the officer's testimony
to the case as a whole; (2) the extent to which the judge covered
prospective jurors' attitudes toward law enforcement personnel with
other questions during voir dire and in the charge to the jury; (3) the
extent to which the officer's credibility was put into issue; and (4) the
extent to which the other, non-law enforcement officer witnesses
corroborated the officer's testimony.61
Having already determined that Corporal Staggs's testimony was
important to the case, the court of appeals turned to an analysis of
the voir dire and the charge to the jury.62 The court cited with favor
three questions asked by the judge: whether the jurors had any
association with law enforcement agencies or officers; whether the
jurors could think of "'any reason ... anything at all'" that would
make it difficult for them to sit as an impartial juror;' and whether
any potential juror "would be prejudiced against [the defendants]
because of their status as inmates."'  As a result of these questions,
the court of appeals concluded, "We find it difficult to imagine that
56. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (describing the Evans standard).
57. See Lancaster, 78 F.3d at 892.
58. See 1.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 893 ("That the district court erred in refusing to ask the proposed voir
dire question does not, however, establish that reversal is required.").
61. See id. (citing United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800, 808 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled
by United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734,736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
62. See id. at 894.
63. Id (quoting the district court).
64. Id. The court reasoned that "the question regarding whether prospective jurors
would be prejudiced against Appellants because of their status as inmates is further
evidence that the voir dire conducted by the district court was adequate to ferret out any
bias and allow the impaneling of an impartial jury." Id. at 894-95.
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any potential juror could fail to recognize that bias in favor of law
enforcement officials was inappropriate.' The court also found that
'the trial court's instruction on credibility "unmistakably convey[ed]
to the jury that [the jury's] credibility determinations were to be
based solely on its observation of the witnesses."
67
The court glossed over the two remaining factors set forth in
Evans.' The court conceded that the defendants had placed
Corporal Staggs's credibility in issue,69  but also noted that
government evidence corroborated Corporal Staggs's testimony
while undermining Vanlierop's account of the incident at Lorton.70
Based on the court's findings concerning voir dire, the credibility
instruction, and the corroborating evidence, it concluded that "the
district court's error in failing to ask the proposed voir dire question
does not warrant reversal."'" Consequently, the three-judge panel of
the court of appeals affirmed the defendants' convictions. n
Less than three months after the court had affirmed the
convictions of Lancaster and Vanlierop pursuant to the Evans rule,
however, a majority of the judges on the Fourth Circuit voted to re-
hear the case en banc and re-examine the Evans rule.' Writing for
the court, Judge Williams began the opinion with an examination of
the "principles governing [appellate] review of challenges to the
65. 1& at 894. Without quoting further from the transcript of the trial, the court
noted that "the spirit of the voir dire proceeding was one of openness and ... the
potential jurors forthrightly expressed their concerns about their ability to be impartial."
Id.
66. See supra note 54 (providing the text of the jury instruction).
67. Lancaster, 78 F.3d at 895 (emphasis added).
68. See id
69. See id. at 893. The court noted that
Vanlierop's testimony contradicted that of Corporal Staggs, placing Staggs's
credibility at issue.... Furthermore, ... cross-examination of Corporal Staggs
regarding the contents of his personnel file called into question his competence
as a correctional officer and, possibly, his motive to lie in order to avoid
disciplinary action as a result of his conduct during the May 14 incident.
Id. at 893-94.
70. See id. at 895. The court noted that while Vanlierop stated that only one shank
was used during the fight, Corporal Staggs had testified that there were two shanks
involved, and the government in fact had submitted two shanks into evidence. See id.
71. Id at 896.
72- See id. at 897.
73. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 734. A majority of judges sitting on a federal court of
appeals may order that an appeal be reheard by the court of appeals en banc. See FED. R.
APP. P. 35. "Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered
except (1) when consideration by the full gourt is necessary to secure or maintain




sufficiency of voir dire."74 During voir dire, she noted, the trial court
must judge the credibility and impartiality of potential jurors.' This
judgment must rest in part on the court's evaluations of each juror's
responses and demeanor during the examination.7  Since the
subtleties of a juror's demeanor and the tone of his or her answers
cannot readily be reviewed on appeal, an appellate court cannot
"'easily second-guess the conclusions of the decisionmaker who
heard and observed the witnesses.' "" Therefore, "[t]he conduct of
voir dire necessarily is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.""'
Accordingly, Judge Williams wrote, with a few limited
exceptions, appellate courts do not require trial courts to ask specific
questions during voir dire.79 The Supreme Court, she noted, has held
that a trial court must ask certain questions upon request only in
capital punishment casese and cases in which race and ethnicity are
likely to play a significant role." Furthermore, even when the
Supreme Court has required trial courts to ask questions, it has not
dictated the form of those questions.' In contrast, Judge Williams
noted, Evans required "that in certain factual situations every refusal
to ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor of
74. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 738.
75. See id. at 739 (citing Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981)
(plurality opinion)).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 739 (quoting Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 182). The court also quoted from
an Eleventh Circuit opinion that noted that" '[b]ecause of its immediate contact with the
voir dire proceeding, the district court is in a far superior position to evaluate particular
voir dire questions than is the court of appeals, which can only rely on the cold record in
conducting its review.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nash, 910
F.2d 749,753 (11th Cir. 1990)).
78. Id. at 738.
79. See id. at 739. For a review of Supreme Court cases deciding whether certain
questions must be asked during voir dire and cases in which the Court held that certain
questions are merely permitted, see generally Gary Knapp, Annotation, Effect of
Accused's Federal Constitutional Rights on Scope of Voir Dire Examination of Prospective
Jurors-Supreme Court Cases, 114 L. Ed. 2d. 763 (1995).
80. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 739. Judge Williams noted that a trial court in a capital
case, if asked by a party to do so, must ask jurors if they would automatically vote for the
death penalty in the event of a conviction or if they would automatically vote against the
death penalty. See id. (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,733-34 (1992)).
81. See id. In cases in which "'racial issues [are] "inextricably bound up with the
conduct of the trial,"' " a trial court must inquire into racial or ethnic prejudice on voir
dire. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189 (quoting
Ristiano v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589,596 (1976))).
82- See id. (citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,431 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
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law enforcement witnesses constitutes error."' The Fourth Circuit
found this per se rule "simply inconsistent with the broad deference
[which the Supreme Court had] traditionally and wisely granted trial
courts in their conduct of voir dire. ' '
The court also noted that Evans had established "a rule with
virtually unlimited application."' Judge Williams asked: If a trial
court must ask the Evans credibility question when the government's
case hinges on the testimony of a law enforcement official, must the
court also ask a similar question when the government's case depends
on the testimony of "any identifiable class of witnesses that might
conceivably be thought by jurors to be inherently credible"?6 The
court suggested that, for the purposes of Evans, "firefighters, priests,
physicians, attorneys, butchers, bakers, or candlestick makers" might
conceivably comprise a class of witnesses thought "inherently
credible" by prospective jurors.'
The court of appeals concluded that "the Evans per se rule of
error offends the deference traditionally accorded the trial court's
conduct of voir dire and is virtually unlimited in its application." ' 8
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit overruled Evans and set forth a new,
more deferential standard." Under the new standard, if a judge
decides not to ask a police-witness credibility question on voir dire,
his decision will not constitute error per se? In fact, such a decision
will constitute an abuse of discretion and reversible error only if an
appellate court determines that the voir dire was not "reasonably
sufficient to probe the prospective jurors for bias and partiality." 9'
Thus, the court of appeals shifted the burden of proof on appeal from
83. Id, at 740.
84. Id. at 741. In his dissent, Judge Murnaghan argued that the Evans rule was
merely "a narrow exception to [the] general rule of deference." Id at 749 (Murnaghan,
J., dissenting) ("To overrule Evans because it conflicts with the general rule of deference
is to ignore the sensitive balancing of interests that constitutional decision-making almost
inevitably requires.").
85. Id. at 741.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. In a footnote, Judge Williams asserted the court's view that "the issue turns
upon the extent to which the public believes that the word of a member of the given
occupation is, as a general matter, to be trusted." Id at 741 n.5 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Yet, she added that "[s]urveys measuring public opinion have
identified an abundance of occupations that the public believes to be trustworthy." Id. at
742 (emphasis added).






one under which the government had to show that the trial judge's
error did not constitute reversible error to one under which the
defendant must show that the trial court abused its discretion.
The court of appeals then applied this new standard to the voir
dire conducted in Lancaster. The court noted that the trial judge had
"carefully probed" potential jurors regarding their association with
law enforcement officers and agencies' and had inquired as to
whether any prospective juror would "be prejudiced against [the
defendants] because of their status as inmates."'93 The judge also had
asked members of the venire whether they could personally think of
"'any reason, ... anything at all'" that would compromise their
ability to sit as impartial jurors, 4 and had "made every effort to
conduct a voir dire proceeding during which potential jurors would
forthrightly express their concerns about their ability to be
impartial."9 5 Therefore, the court found that the judge had conducted
a voir dire "reasonably sufficient to ferret out any bias ... allowing
the impaneling of an impartial jury"96 and affirmed the defendants'
convictions under the new standard.
For the defendants in Lancaster, the Fourth Circuit's en bane
92. See id.
93. Id at 742. The court of appeals noted that
[w]hile such a question obviously is not the same as a question regarding
whether veniremembers would give the testimony of police officers more
credibility solely because of their position, it had the same impact on the jury. In
effect, the district court's questions conveyed to the veniremembers that
Appellants's [sic] testimony should be given the same consideration as that of
any other witnesses. Where, as here, the only "other witnesses" were law
enforcement officers, the undeniable effect of probing for bias against
Appellants was to negate the possibility that members of the jury would give
greater credibility to the testimony of law enforcement officers solely because of
their status.
Id. Judge Murnaghan disagreed with the majority's conclusion. See id& at 752-53
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting). He reasoned that "to state that one group of individuals is
not, on average, less credible than the average citizen is not at all to state that one does
not believe that some other group of individuals is more credible than the average
citizen." Id. at 753 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
94. 1& at 743 (quoting the district court).
95. Id. The court cited with favor the following comment made by the judge to the
venire prior to voir dire:
"[I]t's very important that as a juror you not come into the courtroom with ...
any preconceived ideas, prejudices, biases, or anything like that .... In other
words, the purpose of voir dire is to try to get as impartial a jury as possible....
[I]f you have any doubt about the answer to [a] question, if there is any
possibility that your answer would be yes, raise your hand ......
I& (alterations in original) (quoting the district court's instructions to venire members).
96. Id. at 744.
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review of their case yielded the same result as the three-judge panel's
decision: their convictions were affirmedY Yet a fundamental
change had occurred. The Fourth Circuit had overruled United States
v. Evans." The decision represented a dramatic rejection of the per
se rule adopted by the Fourth Circuit twenty-six years earlier." To
truly appreciate the significance of the Fourth Circuit's en banc
decision, a review of the case law upon which the court of appeals
relied when enunciating Evans is helpful, as well as a review of a few
cases following the Evans decision."
The rule promulgated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Evans originated, in part, with an opinion written by then-Judge
Warren Burger for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Brown v. United States."0' In Brown, two military police
officers witnessed an assault, chased the alleged attacker, and
captured him. °2 At trial, the officers' testimony "constituted the bulk
of the case for the Government."'' The defendant testified on his
own behalf." Presumably concluding that his trial would amount to
a credibility contest between the police and himself, the defendant
asked the trial court to make the following inquiry during voir dire:
"'Would you give greater credence to the testimony of a law
enforcement officer merely because he is an officer as compared to
any other witness[?]' " 0 The court, however, refused to ask the
defendant's question' 6
Setting forth the rule that the Fourth Circuit eventually would
adopt, Judge Burger stated that
when important testimony is anticipated from certain
categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status
is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less,
inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a
97. See id.
98. See id. at 742.
99. See United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110, 1113 (4th Cir. 1970).
100. See infra notes 101-93 and accompanying text.
101. 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
102. See id. at 544.
103. Id. The court noted that the only other witnesses for the prosecution were city
police officers. See id. While these officers did not witness the crime, they testified as to
other matters. See id. The court concluded, "[Ihat the two [city police officers] were also
members of this police category serves only to emphasize the need for the requested
inquiry to the panel." Id at 545.
104. See id. at 544.




juror would have such an inclination is not only appropriate
but should be given if requested."
Yet, Judge Burger concluded, a trial judge's failure to make such an
inquiry upon request would not necessarily require reversal of the
case."' Instead, "the issue turns on the degree of impact which the
testimony in question would be likely to have had on the jury and
what part such testimony played in the case as a whole."'' 9 Thus,
Brown enunciated a two-part analysis. First, if a judge failed to make
the requested inquiry regarding a certain type of witness, he
committed an error. Second, Brown required that when reviewing a
case, the court of appeals must determine the impact of the witness's
testimony on the case and decide whether the impact was great
enough to warrant reversal.
Reviewing the facts of the case pursuant to this standard, the
Brown court noted that "'virtually the entire case for the
prosecution'" rested upon the testimony of two law enforcement
officers.1 Their status as police officers "serve[d] only to emphasize
the need for the requested inquiry to the panel.""' Therefore, the
court held first that the trial judge should have made the requested
inquiry during voir dire and second that the lower court's failure to
do so constituted reversible error.'
Six years later, the Fourth Circuit expressly adopted the Brown
rule in United States v. Gore.' In Gore, two defendants were on trial
107. Ld. at 545. Such an inquiry, Judge Burger noted, "should include whether any
juror would tend to give either more or less credence because of the occupation or
category of the prospective witness." Id. He reasoned that the responses of prospective
jurors would provide each side with "relevant and useful information for exercising
peremptory challenges or challenges for cause." Id.
10. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per
curiam)).
111. Id. In a footnote, the court emphasized that the critical problem in the case was
the jury's awareness of the officers' status. See id. at 545 n.3.
112. See id. at 545.
113. 435 F.2d 1110, 1113 (4th Cir. 1970). The Fourth Circuit's decision in Lancaster
did not expressly overrule its decision in Gore; however, Lancaster did overrule United
States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1990), which applied a similar two-part analysis.
See Evans, 917 F.2d at 807; see also supra notes 13-17 (discussing the Evans standard).
Therefore, Gore's reasoning conflicts with the standard set forth in Lancaster, and its
validity is in question. Compare Gore, 435 F.2d at 1113 (stating that a court's failure to
question the jury as to potential biases in favor of law enforcement testimony constitutes
per se error, though not necessarily reversible error), with Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 742
(overruling Evans and stating that the reversal of a judge's refusal to ascertain potential
jury biases depends upon whether the voir dire examination was "reasonably sufficient to
probe the prospective jurors for bias and partiality").
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for possession of property stolen from a shipment moving in
interstate commerce.14 The judge declined to ask prospective jurors
whether "'any member of the jury believe[s] that the testimony of a
policeman should be afforded greater credence than the defendant
merely because he is a police officer.' .". On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit expressly adopted Brown's two-part analysis."6 Several police
officers testified in Gore."7 Consequently, pursuant to Brown, the
court of appeals considered the impact of the officers' testimony on
the trial."" Finding that "the bare facts to which [the officers]
testified were not seriously disputed," the court held that the trial
judge had not committed reversible error by refusing to ask the
defendants' question."9
In 1990, the Fourth Circuit modified the second tier of this
analysis in United States v. Evans," adopting a more detailed
balancing test from the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Baldwin."' In Baldwin, the defendant, Joe Don Baldwin, was tried
and convicted "based primarily upon the testimony of two
114. See Gore, 435 F.2d at 1111. The Fourth Circuit's opinion does not reveal many
facts of the case. According to the brief of appellee Haywood Liles, Gore's codefendant,
the defendants hijacked a truck transporting television sets from Maryland to Virginia.
See Brief for Appellee at 2, United States v. Liles, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970) (No.
14249). Acting on a tip, police subsequently apprehended the defendants, who were
driving a rental truck and a car in which the rental agreement was located. See id. Six of
the hijacked television sets were found in the truck. See id.
115. Gore, 435 F.2d at 1113 (quoting the defendant's proposed question to venire
members). The judge also refused to ask if any of the prospective jurors would be
prejudiced against the defendants because the defendants were black, contending that
such a question would unnecessarily interject race into the case. See id, at 1111. The
court of appeals did not decide "whether every refusal of an accused's request for a voir
dire examination on racial prejudice is such an impairment of the right to challenge
jurors" that every refusal warrants giving the defendant a new trial. Id. at 1112.
However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that in this case the refusal was not harmless
because "many of the government witnesses were white." Id. Therefore, the court
reversed the defendants' convictions and remanded the case. See id. at 1113.
116. See id. at 1113. The court of appeals noted that "[c]ourts have differed on the
propriety of [the defendants' question] and similar questions. We approve the rule stated




119. Id. The police testimony was offered only to place one of the defendants at the
scene of the recovery of some of the television sets. See Brief for Appellee at 7, United
States v. Liles, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970) (No. 14249). Apparently the defendant had
admitted to being present at the scene. See id,
120. 917 F.2d 800, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Lancaster, 96
F.3d 734,736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
121. 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979).
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[government] agents" of stealing cacti from publicly owned land.'
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Baldwin argued that the trial court
had committed reversible error when it refused to ask ten of his
eleven proposed voir dire questions.m One of the questions that the
judge had opted not to ask potential jurors was whether they would
give greater credibility to the testimony of government agents simply
because they were law enforcement officers. 4
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that trial judges were entrusted
with discretion over the conduct of voir dire, but held that this
discretion would be abused if the trial judge did not accept enough of
a party's voir dire questions "to test the jury for bias or partiality."'12
The court noted that "the parties have the right to some surface
information about prospective jurors which might furnish the basis
for an informed exercise of peremptory challenges or motions to
strike for cause based upon a lack of impartiality."'12 That
information includes knowledge of jurors' attitudes toward
government agents." Therefore, the court of appeals held that as an
initial matter the judge's refusal to inquire into the credibility issue
during voir dire constituted an error.2 The court noted, however,
that an appellate court must conduct a two-part inquiry when
reviewing cases like the one before it. 9 A judge's decision not to
make the requested inquiry on voir dire did not necessarily warrant
reversal."' The Ninth Circuit held that when deciding whether to
reverse, an appellate court must consider
such factors as [1] the importance of the government agent's
testimony to the case as a whole; [2] the extent to which the
question concerning the venireperson's attitude toward
government agents is covered in other questions on voir dire
122. Id. at 1296.
123. See id. at 1297. The only requested inquiry that the trial court did make was





128. See id. (citing Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
129. See id at 1298. The court of appeals noted that "[a]ll circuits appear to be in
agreement that the refusal to ask the question of whether the prospective jurors would be
unduly influenced by the testimony of a law enforcement officer does not always
constitute reversible error" and cited a handful of cases in support. Id. (citing United
States v. Golden, 532 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); Ross v. United States, 374 F.2d 97,
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and on the charge to the jury; [3] the extent to which the
credibility of the government agent-witness is put into issue;
and [4] the extent to which the testimony of the government
agent is corroborated by non-agent witnesses."'
Thus, while retaining the first part of the Brown analysis, the Ninth
Circuit significantly expanded the second part.'
Eleven years after the Ninth Circuit decided Baldwin, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the Baldwin standard in
United States v. Evans.3s Evans involved a purchase of cocaine made
by an undercover agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA").4 The only witnesses to testify at trial were the
DEA agent and the two defendants, a drug dealer and a drug courier,
all of whom were participants in the transaction.'35 Thus, the
defendants apparently believed that the outcome of the trial would
be determined largely on whether the jury decided to believe the
DEA agent or the defendants." The defendants, therefore, asked
the judge to make the following inquiry during voir dire: "'Is there
anyone who would give special credence and weight to the word of a
law enforcement officer simply because of the fact that he occupies
that position?' ,,137 The judge refused to ask the proposed question'm
131. Id.
132. Ironically, after thoroughly enunciating the standard for reversal, the Baldwin
court did not apply it to the facts. Because the trial judge also failed to ask the members
of the venire whether they were "acquainted with any of the prospective witnesses in the
case" per the request of the defendant, id. at 1297, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
judge had "severely limitfed] the scope of voir dire," id, at 1298. Thus, "the decisive
factor in the case at bar [was] that the trial judge refused to ask both ... question[s]." Id.
(emphasis added). The court rejected the argument that it would have been inefficient
and time-consuming for the judge to list each prospective witness and ask whether any
members of the venire knew any of the witnesses. See idt at 1297-98. The court stated
that "[t]he few minutes which would be consumed by the asking of the question, the
reading of the witness lists, and the answering of the question is outweighed by the
importance of the question to the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges by both
parties." Id.
133. 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734,
736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
134. See ia at 802.
135. See id. The agent met with a suspected drug dealer in the agent's car and
indicated that he wished to purchase cocaine from the dealer. See id. After the agent
counted out the money, a drug courier entered the car and gave the agent a bag of crack
cocaine. See id. The agent then paid the dealer and all three parties separated. See id.
The government subsequently charged both the courier and the dealer with distributing
crack cocaine. See id, A fourth individual was present during the transaction; however,
he was not indicted and did not testify at trial. See id.
136. See id. at 806.




The Fourth Circuit began its review in Evans by emphasizing the
significance of voir dire in assuring that criminal defendants receive a
fair trial. 9 An effective voir dire would allow both sides in a trial to
exercise their challenges to particular prospective jurors
intelligently'" and thereby " 'assure the parties that the jurors before
whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed
before them and not otherwise.' ,," In this case, the court indicated
that "an expression by a prospective juror that special weight and
credence should be given to the testimony of a law enforcement
officer simply because of his position" would be invaluable to the
defendants when making their challenges. 42 Therefore, the court
held that "[i]t was an abuse of discretion not to ask the proposed
question.
, 143
Having determined that the trial judge committed an error by
refusing to make the requested inquiry, the court of appeals next
addressed the issue of whether the error required reversal.' The
court looked to Baldwin's four-factor test to guide its review of the
case.' 45 First, the court noted that the government's entire case rested
on the testimony of one DEA agent.' Second, the court found that
the proposed inquiry was not covered either in other questions asked
138. See id. The judge commented that the proposed question "'simply deal[s] with
instructions on the law, and that isn't necessary to ask in voir dire. I will instruct the jury
on the law of the case and the credibility of witnesses and those things.'" Id. (quoting the
trial court's denial of the defendants' request for additional questioning of the jury).
139. See id. at 806-07.
140. See id. at 807.
141. Id. at 806 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,219 (1965), overruled on other
grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), but omitting a comma between
"them" and "and"). The court concluded that "[i]f a juror was prepared to find [the DEA
agent] believable simply because of his position as a DEA agent, the defendants did not
receive a fair trial." Id.
142. Id. This would be particularly true if a juror should respond affirmatively to the
question, in which case, the court noted, the judge would have to excuse the juror for
cause or, at the very least, convince the prospective juror, "by instructions and additional
questions," that "there is no special credence due the testimony of a policeman." Id.
143. Id. at 807.
144. See id. ("[A] failure to ask a question on voir dire may often be harmless, but here
the voir dire was perfunctory, the question was vital to a fair exercise of peremptory
challenges, the request was made and denied, and the point was not covered in the closing
jury charge.").
145. See id. at 807-08 (citing United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir.
1979)). The court noted that "[tihe question refused in Baldwin is the same as that
requested by [defendant] Evans .... Baldwin discussed the matters that should be
considered when this question is proposed." Id. at 808. For a discussion of Baldwin, see
supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
146. See Evans, 917 F.2d at 808.
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during voir dire or by the charge to the jury.147 Third, the court
acknowledged that the defendants put the DEA agent's credibility
into issue."' Fourth, the court noted that the agent's testimony was
not corroborated by any non-agent witnesses.'49 Concluding that
"[t]he factors set forth in Baldwin all fit our facts,"'' the court held
that the trial court had committed reversible error.51
Evans, however, was not the product of a unanimous three-judge
panel. In his dissent from the decision, Judge Wilkinson announced
that he had serious misgivings about the court's conclusion that the
trial judge's decision merited reversal.' While conceding that the
question concerning police-witness credibility should have been
asked, Judge Wilkinson concluded that "[t]he questions which the
trial judge did ask during voir dire demonstrate that he made an
[adequate] effort to probe the jury for bias."'" In support of his
conclusion, the circuit judge noted that the trial court asked if any
prospective juror worked in law enforcement and also asked jurors if
they could think of any reason why they could not be impartial.'5
147. See id. The trial judge gave the following charge relating to credibility to the jury:
"[Y]ou as jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight that their testimony deserves. You may be guided by the appearance and
the conduct of the witness, or by the manner in which the witness testifies, or by
the character of the testimony given.
You should carefully scrutinize all the testimony given, the circumstances
under which each witness has testified, and ever[y] matter in evidence which
tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief. Consider each witness'
intelligence, motive and state of mind, and demeanor and manner while on the
stand. Consider the witness' ability to observe the matters as to which he has
testified, and whether he impresses you as having an accurate recollection of
those matters.
Consider also any relation each witness may bear to either side of the
case, the manner in which each witness might be affected by the verdict, and the
extent to which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted by
other evidence in the case."
Id. at 806-07 (alteration in original) (quoting the district court's charge to the jury). The
court of appeals concluded that "[t]his general charge does not cover the issue presented
by the proposed question to the venire. Without such a question and without a charge on
the issue, a juror could believe that the testimony of a police officer was entitled to some
special weight or credence." Id at 807.
148. See id. at 808.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 809.
152. See id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
153. See id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 811 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
155. See ia. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Specifically, the trial judge asked:
"[C]onsidering all of the questions I have already asked you, is there any reason
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Furthermore, Judge Wilkinson added, the trial court's general
instruction on witness credibility "plainly admonished the jury to
consider in a sober and impartial light the testimony of each witness
in the case," thereby preventing a juror from giving undue weight to
the testimony of the DEA agent.' His findings led Judge Wilkinson
to draw a conclusion similar to that reached by the court of appeals in
Lancaster' "There is every reason to believe that the jury here took
its obligations seriously and no reason to believe that impermissible
bias on the part of any juror influenced the outcome of this case. '
Finally, he noted: "Our task is to ensure fairness, not to demand
perfection. Because fairness was not compromised by the district
judge's failure to pose a single question on voir dire, I respectfully
dissent."'' 9
Just months after the court of appeals decided Evans, it
considered the case of United States v. Muldoon."° In Muldoon, a
defendant was charged with bribing a United States Marine Corps
employee in order to obtain government defense contracts.16' During
jury voir dire for the case, the trial judge refused to ask members of
the venire three questions proposed by the defendant, two of which
concerned whether jurors would ascribe undue credibility to
government witnesses. 62  At trial, the government presented
why any one of you could not sit on the jury and render a fair and impartial
verdict based upon the evidence presented here in the courtroom and the
instructions on the law as will be given you by the court?"
Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting the district court's question to venire members).
This inquiry is very similar to the one posed by the trial judge in Lancaster. See supra text
accompanying note 53 (providing a quotation of the inquiry).
156. Evans, 917 F.2d at 811 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
157. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing the similar analysis from
Lancaster).
158. Evans, 917 F.2d at 811 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson's dissent
suggests that he would have required more to reverse the case than a showing that the
trial judge failed to probe sufficiently for juror bias. He argued that the court should
require a defendant to show that his trial, in fact, had been prejudiced by juror bias. See
id. at 809-11 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295,
1298 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that when the scope of voir dire is severely limited, a
defendant suffers prejudice because his right to challenge prospective jurors peremptorily
or for cause is inhibited).
159. Evans, 917 F.2d at 811-12 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
160. 931 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1991). Interestingly, though, the Fourth Circuit did not
mention Evans in the case, instead relying on the standard as adopted in United States v.
Gore, 435 F.2d 1110, 1113 (4th Cir. 1970). See Muldoon, 931 F.2d at 286. For a discussion
of the Gore standard, see supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
161. See Muldoon, 931 F.2d at 284.
162. See id. at 286. The defendant asked the court to inquire
(1) whether any members of the panel would give a government witness more
credence than a defense witness; (2) whether anyone would give greater weight
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recorded telephone conversations that incriminated the defendant.1 "
In response, the defendant neither testified nor introduced any
evidence, but instead tried to prove solely through the arguments of
his counsel that he was guilty of a lesser crime.1 " The jury, however,
convicted him of bribery.'" On appeal, the defendant, relying not on
Evans but instead on the Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Baldwin,'6 argued that the trial court's refusal to inquire into the
attitudes of prospective jurors toward government witnesses required
a reversal of his conviction.' 67
Like the defendant, the three Fourth Circuit judges deciding
Muldoon did not mention Evans. Instead, much like the Evans court,
the judges drew from Baldwin and Gore and propounded a standard
of review. The standard, however, appeared different than the one
set forth in Evans. The Muldoon court did not discuss whether the
judge's refusal to ask the question constituted an error per se in cases
that were essentially swearing contests between police and a
defendant. Evans, on the other hand, held that such a failure was an
automatic abuse of discretion.'" Instead, the Muldoon court noted
that a trial court "abuses its discretion only 'where the court's
restriction hinders a defendant's opportunity to make reasonable use
of his challenges.' ,169 The court, however, did conduct a review
similar to the second tier of the Evans standard. Citing United States
v. Gore, the court held that "[w]hether exclusion of questions sought
by a defendant gives rise to reversible error must be considered in the
context of the entire case and the other inquiries the trial court made
during voir dire."'70
to the testimony of a government investigator simply because of his position; and
(3) whether any member of the panel or their close relatives worked for the FBI,
IRS, United States Attorney, [Virginia] Commonwealth's Attorney, or any other
investigative agency.
Id.
163. See id. at 285.
164. See id. at 289.
165. See id at 284.
166. 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979); see also supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text
(discussing Baldwin).
167. See Muldoon, 931 F.2d at 286. The court did not explain why the defendant did
not cite Evans.
168. See United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800,809 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled by United
States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734,736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
169. Muldoon, 931 F.2d at 286 (quoting King v. Jones, 824 F.2d 324, 326 (4th Cir.
1987)).
170. Id (citing United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110, 1113 (4th Cir. 1970)). The court
also correctly noted that "Baldwin, on which Muldoon relies, lays down no per se rule of
reversal for failure to ask about bias in favor of the credibility of police because of their
[Vol. 76
JURY VOIR DIRE
Under this "Muldoon standard," the court found that the
defendant had failed to demonstrate that the judge's decision
warranted a reversal of the case." The court noted that the case did
not depend on the credibility of government agents for two reasons.
First, "Muldoon called no witnesses and declined to testify,
[therefore] there could be no comparison of defense and government
witnesses."'" Second, the court concluded that Muldoon's conviction
rested primarily on wiretaps and the confessions of co-conspirators
rather than the testimony of government agents."
Even though the court of appeals effectively ignored the Evans
standard in Muldoon, the court discussed the standard one year later,
in Adams v. Aiken.74 The voir dire proceedings in Adams involved a
strange twist. According to the court of appeals:
[During voir dire] [o]ne of the prospective jurors stated ...
that he would believe a police officer's testimony before
that of a private citizen. The trial judge then asked the juror
if he could make a determination based on the evidence
presented in court and the court's instructions on the law
and if he could evaluate the testimony of the witnesses from
what he saw in court. When the prospective juror
responded that he could, the judge qualified him over [the
defendant's] objection.7 5
The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of kidnapping
and murder, ultimately sentencing him to death. 6  As part of his
position." Id.
171. See id
172. Id. In light of these facts, it appears that Muldoon would not have been entitled
to reversal even under Evans. After all, Evans held that the judge abuses his discretion
by failing to ask the proposed question when jurors will decide the case solely on the basis
of whether they believe the testimony of the criminal defendant or the testimony of the
police. See United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800, 807 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled by United
States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); see also Lancaster, 96 F.3d
at 740 (interpreting Evans as holding that "when the Government's case depends wholly
on the testimony of law enforcement agents," the judge's refusal to inquire about police-
witness credibility during voir dire "is, without more, an abuse of discretion" (emphasis
added)).
173. See Muldoon, 931 F.2d at 286-87.
174. 965 F.2d 1306, 1317 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Adams v.
Evatt, 511 U.S. 1001 (1994). In Adams, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial
of Sylvester Lewis Adams's habeas corpus petition. See id. at 1309. Without much
explanation, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying the petition for writ of
certiorari to the Fourth Circuit, granted the petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari, and remanded the case to the
Fourth Circuit. See Adams, 511 U.S. at 1001.
175. Adams, 956 F.2d at 1317.
176. See id. at 1309.
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habeas petition to the Fourth Circuit, the defendant argued that by
qualifying the juror who initially indicated that he would give undue
credence to the words of a police officer, the judge denied the
defendant's right to an impartial jury."
The court of appeals held, however, that even under Evans the
trial judge was not required to excuse "every juror evidencing bias
toward police testimony."'78 The trial court's instructions to the juror
and the juror's response to the judge supported the conclusion that
the juror would be impartial. 79 Critically, the court of appeals noted,
"police testimony ... did not form a predominant part of the
government's case."'" Instead, civilian Witnesses and physical
evidence strongly supported the jury's verdict.8 Since the first tier of
the Evans standard required that "the government's case completely
dependi] on police testimony," the court concluded that "Adams's
reliance on United States v. Evans... does not help him."
'1 2
In the same year it decided Adams v. Aiken, the Fourth Circuit
applied the Evans standard to civil cases for the first time in Rainey v.
Conerly." In Rainey, a prisoner filed a civil suit against a prison
guard, alleging that the guard had used excessive force against him
177. See id. at 1317.
178. Id.
179. See id. But see United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1979)
("'The sole purpose of voir dire is not to tell potential jurors that they are to be fair and
then ask them if they think they can be impartial.'" (quoting United States v. Martin, 507
F.2d 428,432 (7th Cir. 1974))).
180. Adams, 965 F.2d at 1317.
181. See i. at 1309-10 (reviewing the evidence against Adams).
182. Id. at 1317.
183. 973 F.2d 321,325 (4th Cir. 1992), overruled by United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d
734, 736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). At least one other circuit has applied an Evans-type
rule to civil cases. See Faulkner Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 557 F.2d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
For an overview of cases in which federal courts have considered the propriety of a trial
judge's refusal to ask certain questions on voir dire in civil cases, see generally Donald
Paul Duffala, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Federal Court's Refusal on
Voir Dire in Civil Action to Ask or Permit Questions Submitted by Counsel, 72 A.L.R.
FED. 638 (1985).
The Fourth Circuit's expansion of the Evans standard in spite of its reluctance even
to cite it in Muldoon or to apply it to Adams is likely attributable in part to the fact that
the judges who heard Rainey were different than the ones who decided Muldoon and
Adams. Judges Ervin and Hamilton, who decided Rainey, which expanded Evans, joined
the dissent in Lancaster. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 736. Of the three judges who heard
Adams, only one-Judge Wilkins-also heard Lancaster, and he joined the majority
opinion. See id None of the three judges who comprised the panel that heard Muldoon,
931 F.2d 282, 284 (4th Cir. 1991), were on the court when the Fourth Circuit considered
Lancaster. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 736.
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while he was incarcerated in a North Carolina county jail."l A jury
found against the plaintiff-prisoner, who appealed to the Fourth
Circuit." On appeal, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the trial
court had committed reversible error when it refused to ask
prospective jurors if "they would tend to credit the testimony of a law
enforcement official over that of a prisoner, simply because of their
respective positions.""
The court of appeals noted that there were four "striking" and
critical similarities between Rainey and United States v. Evans. First,
the court noted that the rejected voir dire questions in each case were
"nearly identical.""' Second, both cases "boiled down to a credibility
determination" between a law enforcement officer and defense
witnesses." Third, in each case the trial court gave only a general
instruction on witness credibility."9 Fourth, in neither Rainey nor
Evans did the party proposing the question "burden the trial court
with an overly long list of proposed voir dire questions."'19
Due to these similarities between Evans and Rainey, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that no "principled distinction [could] be drawn"
between them.'' The court decided that the fact that Rainey was a
civil case while Evans was a criminal case was irrelevant."
Therefore, the court held that Evans controlled and that the district
court's failure to pose the plaintiffs voir dire question entitled the
plaintiff to a new trial." Thus, it appeared that the Evans rule was
184. See Rainey, 973 F.2d at 322. Rainey, the prisoner, alleged that Conerly, the
prison guard, lost his temper over a dispute concerning visitation privileges and slammed
Rainey into a wall three times, injuring the prisoner's back. See id at 323. Conerly
testified that he acted out of a concern for his own safety and that he used only a
necessary degree of force against Rainey. See id The court noted, "the dispositive issue
in this case depends on the [jury's] evaluation of the conflicting testimony of Rainey and
other prisoners against that of Conerly and other police officers." Id. at 325.
185. See id. at 322.
186. Id at 325.
187. Id at 325 & n.1 ("Rainey requested the following voir dire question: 'Simply
because of their status, would any member of the jury panel be predisposed to believe the
word of a law enforcement officer or prison guard against that of a prisoner?'" (quoting
defendant Rainey's proposed question to venire members)).
188. Id at 325.
189. See id.
190. Id. The court also noted that "coincidentally, in both Evans and this case the
appellants submitted exactly 17 proposed questions." Id.
191. Id
192. See id at 325 n.2 ("[Ain unbiased jury is no less a concern in civil proceedings
than in criminal trials." (citing Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 (4th
Cir. 1986))).
193. See id. at 325. Interestingly, the court did not, however, review the case under the
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firmly planted in the Fourth Circuit's voir dire jurisprudence.
In United States v. Lancaster, however, the Fourth Circuit
expressly overruled both Evans and Rainey.194 The court rested its
decision on two grounds. First, the court found that the Evans rule
offended "the deference traditionally accorded the trial court's
conduct of voir dire."'195 Second, the court found that Evans
problematically established "a rule with virtually unlimited
application." '96 The court feared that if a defendant could make a
plausible argument that jurors might find a certain type of witness
inherently credible, trial judges would feel obligated to ask jurors
whether they would also lend that witness undue credibility merely
because of his status.'7 Yet both of these conclusions merit scrutiny.
In concluding that appellate courts should give considerable
deference to the decisions made by trial courts conducting voir dire,
the Fourth Circuit turned to several Supreme Court decisions."'
Although the Supreme Court has the power to set specific standards
for jury selection procedures in both federal and state cases,"' it has
been reluctant to do so.' Instead, the Court has declined to
promulgate detailed rules, noting that "[v]oir dire 'is conducted under
the supervision of the [trial] court, and a great deal must, of necessity,
be left to its sound discretion.' ""' The Court has concluded that the
demeanor of a juror and his responses to voir dire questions play a
critical role in the judge's determination of whether that juror can be
standard for reversal articulated in Evans. The court did not even mention this second
tier of analysis. This omission could be interpreted as suggesting that in civil cases no
such analysis is necessary. It seems more likely, however, that the similarities between
Evans and Rainey merely made such analysis unnecessary in this particular case.
194. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 736 ("[W]e overrule Evans and cases relying upon its
reasoning."); id. at 742 & n.6 (referring specifically to Rainey).
195. Id. at 742.
196. Id. at 741.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 738-40 (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 119 (1992); Mu'Min v.
Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (plurality opinion); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)).
199. The Supreme Court has noted that it may, pursuant to its supervisory powers,
dictate the requirements of voir dire in federal courts and may enforce constitutional
standards for voir dire in state court cases. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 422.
200. See Laura Cooper, Note, Voir Dire in Federal Criminal Trials: Protecting the
Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 48 IND. L.J. 269, 273 (1973); Jay M. Spears, Note,
Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory
Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1510-14 (1975).




impartial.' Since an appellate court does not have the same
opportunity to observe juror behavior firsthand as a trial court has,
the Supreme Court has suggested that determinations of impartiality
be left largely within the discretion of the trial judge."0 3
Instead of offering specific guidance on how to conduct voir dire,
the Court has held that trial courts are limited only by "the essential
demands of fairness" in their handling of the jury selection process.2
By opting not to address what "fairness" specifically demands in most
cases,202 the Court has allowed federal courts of appeals to set
standards for determining whether voir dire proceedings are fair.
Thus, in Lancaster the Fourth Circuit was able to dictate what
fairness required.
The Supreme Court also has consistently refused to hear cases in
which a trial judge has denied a defendant's request to have jurors
questioned about their feelings toward law enforcement witness
testimony.2" Like the Fourth Circuit, almost every federal circuit has,
however, specifically addressed this issue, and a clear majority have
202. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188; Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 594-95.
203. In Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), the Supreme Court noted that
during voir dire a trial judge "must scrutinize not only spoken words but also gestures and
attitudes of all [prospective jurors] to ensure the jury's impartiality." Id. at 875. The
Court further commented that "only words can be preserved for review; no transcript can
recapture the atmosphere of the voir dire." Id. Other Supreme Court cases have
recognized the practicality of deferring to the trial court on issues concerning the conduct
of voir dire. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189 ("Because the obligation to impanel
an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely
largely on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample discretion
in determining how best to conduct the voir dire."); Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 595 ("[T]he
'determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is
particularly within the province of the trial judge.'" (quoting Rideau v. Lousiana, 373
U.S. 723,733 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting))).
204. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931) ("The exercise of [the trial
judge's] discretion, and the restriction upon inquiries at the request of counsel, were
subject to the essential demands of fairness."); see also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724
(1961) (noting that" 'the Constitution lays down no particular tests and [the] procedure
[for voir dire] is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula'" (quoting United
States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 146 (1936))).
205. As the Lancaster court noted, however, the Court has proffered specific
requirements for death penalty cases, see Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 739 (citing Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1992)), and cases concerning racial and ethnic prejudices,
see id. (citing Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189).
206. The Court denied certiorari in Lancaster. See Lancaster v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 967 (1997). The Court also denied petitions for certiorari in other cases concerning
voir dire questions on police-witness credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 981
F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1992), cerL denied, 507 U.S. 1041 (1993); United States v. Victoria-
Peguero, 920 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932 (1991); United States v.
Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994 (1989); United States v. Espinosa,
771 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1023 (1985).
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adopted guidelines for voir dire similar to the Evans rule. 7 Writing
for the Lancaster court, Judge Williams contended, however, that
there was merely "a division among the circuits on this issue." 8 She
wrote, "our holding today merely aligns us with the circuits rejecting
the rule that in certain factual situations every refusal specifically to
ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor of law
enforcement witnesses constitutes error."'  In support of her
conclusion, Judge Williams cited decisions from three different
circuits; none of the cases, however, addressed the issue of voir dire
questions about the credibility due police-witness testimony.210 Yet it
does appear that two other circuits have considered the particular
issue and reached a decision similar to the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Lancaster.211
207. See United States v. Alarape, 969 F.2d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Powell, 932 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1991); Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d at 84-85 (First
Circuit); Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1164 (Second Circuit); Espinosa, 771 F.2d at 1405 (Tenth
Circuit); United States v. Spaar, 748 F.2d 1249, 1252-54 (8th Cir. 1984); Brown v. United
States, 338 F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1964); see also Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 746-49
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority rule and several cases adopting it in
other circuits).
208. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 740. As a result of the Lancaster en banc decision, however,
the Fourth Circuit has expressly rejected an Evans-type standard. See id at 736; see also
supra note 207 (listing the jurisdictions that constitute the majority). Lancaster withdrew
the Fourth Circuit from the majority of circuits but did not align it with a unified minority.
Although two other circuit courts have addressed the issue, they have not produced a
standard exactly like Lancaster's or exactly like the majority's standard. See infra note
211 (discussing the standards adopted by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits).
209. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 740.
210. See id The court cited cases from the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits. Judge
Williams relied in part on the Third Circuit case Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705 (3d Cir.
1993), which concerned voir dire questions on pretrial publicity. See id at 710. She also
cited United States v. Quiroz-Hernandez, 48 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 1995), but in that case, the
Fifth Circuit considered whether the trial court was required to pose questions concerning
specific manifestations of juror attitudes toward illegal drugs after the judge had already
asked general questions about those attitudes. See id. at 868-69. Finally, Judge Williams
cited the Eleventh Circuit case of United States v. Daniels, 986 F.2d 451 (11th Cir. 1993).
It, however, concerned the potentially prejudicial impact of the comments of one juror on
his fellow jurors. See id..at 454.
211. In United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit
considered a case in which the trial court had refused to ask "whether the prospective
jurors' relationships with police officers would cause them to favor the testimony of a
police officer if the officer's testimony conflicted with the testimony of a civilian." Id. at
870. The court did not specifically articulate a rule similar to the one set forth by the
Fourth Circuit in either Evans or Lancaster. Instead, the court held that "the [trial] court
abuses its discretion [only] if it restricts the scope of voir dire in a manner that unduly
impairs the defendant's ability to exercise his peremptory challenges or make his
challenges for cause." Id. This broad, deferential standard suggests that the Sixth Circuit
has decided not to adopt a per se rule analogous to the one developed in Evans.
In United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1990), the Eleventh Circuit
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Notably, the circuits that have adopted an Evans-type standard
have not, in fact, renounced the policy of granting trial courts broad
discretion in their conduct of voir dire. An examination of the voir
dire jurisprudence from each of these circuits reveals that they have
merely provided for a narrow exception to the broad deference
granted to lower courts. As a general matter, in cases concerning
other challenges to jury selection procedures, these courts
consistently defer to the trial court.12 In cases like Lancaster, which
specifically address the issue of questions concerning the credibility
due police-witness testimony, the courts have reaffirmed that the
conduct of voir dire generally lies within the discretion of the trial
court.213 Furthermore, these circuits often have declined to reverse
considered a judge's refusal to ask jurors the following questions:
"If a witness who is a law enforcement officer gives testimony in this case that
conflicts with or contradicts the testimony of a witness who is not a law
enforcement officer, would you be inclined to believe the former's testimony
over the latter's simply because the former is a law enforcement officer?
Generally speaking, are you inclined to believe as true what a police officer
might say due solely to his or her position?"
Id. at 753 n.1 (quoting defendant's proposed questions to venire members). The court
held that "we will find no abuse of discretion if the voir dire questioning as a whole
complied with 'the essential demands of fairness,' that is, if it gave a reasonable assurance
to the parties that any prejudice of the potential jurors would be discovered." Id. at 753
(quoting United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505, 507 (11th Cir. 1983)). Although the
Eleventh Circuit did not adopt a per se rule that the judge's refusal constituted an abuse
of discretion, it did review the case under the standard articulated in United States v.
Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979). See Nash, 910 F.2d at 755-56. For a discussion of
the Baldwin standard, see supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
212. See United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 442 (1st Cir. 1994) ("The trial court
has broad discretion in conducting voir dire. 'It is more than enough if the court covers
the substance of the appropriate areas of concern by framing questions in its own
words.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1987)));
United States v. Powell, 932 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It is wholly within the
judge's discretion to reject supplemental questions proposed by counsel if the voir dire is
otherwise reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality."); United States v.
Fish, 928 F.2d 185, 186 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Trial judges enjoy considerable discretion in
determining the questions to be asked in voir dire .... Judges need not use every
question submitted by counsel; they need only use those to which an anticipated response
would afford the basis for a challenge for cause."); United States v. Maldonado-Rivera,
922 F.2d 934, 970 (2d Cir. 1990) (" 'The judge decides what questions may be addressed
to the jury panel, and although the questioning must be fair, it need not include specific
points requested by a particular defendant.'" (quoting United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d
1125, 1133 (2d Cir. 1989))).
213. See United States v. Quiroz-Hernandez, 48 F.3d 858, 868 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The
trial judge has broad discretion in conducting voir dire."); United States v. Alarape, 969
F.2d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A trial judge possesses substantial discretion in the voir
dire .... "); United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382,1405 (10th Cir. 1985) ("The scope of
voir dire examination is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not
be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion."); United States v.
Spaar, 748 F.2d 1249, 1253 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[D]istrict courts have been accorded broad
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cases when other circumstances in the cases have so strongly
supported a finding of guilt that reversing the case and requiring the
trial judge to ask a specific question on voir dire presumably would
not change the verdict.214 This case law from other circuits suggests
that a limited per se rule can coexist with a voir dire standard under
which appellate courts generally defer to trial courts on jury selection
matters.15
The Lancaster court, however, worried not only that the per se
rule offended "the deference traditionally accorded the trial court's
conduct of voir dire,, 21" but also that it threatened to transform voir
discretion in determining how best to conduct voir dire.").
214. See Alarape, 969 F.2d at 351 (holding that in a case that turned on inferences from
uncontested facts, the judge's refusal to ask whether jurors would "believe the word of a
... law enforcement agent automatically over the word of the defendant" or whether they
would "put more weight into the credibility of a[n] ... agent as to that of the defendant"
did not entitle the defendant to a reversal); United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d
77, 84-85 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the government's case was "largely corroborated" by
other witnesses and that "many of the matters on which the agents' testimony was hotly
disputed ... were resolved by the judge, not the jury," and concluding that where the
judge sufficiently instructed the jury on witness credibility issues, there was no need to
reverse the case even though the judge would not ask jurors if they thought government
agents were more credible); United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1165 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that no reversal should be granted when the government witnesses gave only
brief testimony, the judge "properly charged the jury in regard to assessing the credibility
of law enforcement witnesses ... [,] the credibility of most of the official witnesses was
not subject to extensive challenge," and the defendant's own accomplices provided the
incriminating evidence against him); Espinosa, 771 F.2d at 1405 (concluding that the
judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to ask specifically whether jurors would lend
undue credibility to the testimony of law enforcement officers, because the judge asked
several other bias-related questions on voir dire and instructed the jury to base its
decision on the testimony "without prejudice or sympathy"); Spaar, 748 F.2d at 1254
(holding that the defendant's conviction should not be reversed when the defendant has
not placed the credibility of the law enforcement officers into issue and the trial court has
asked whether jurors with connections to law enforcement personnel would consequently
give more credence to their testimony).
215. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 749 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) ("The fact that
discretion is and should be accorded to district courts in their handling of the voir dire
process in most instances does not seem to me to present an obstacle to identifying-as
the courts [of appeals] ... have identified-a narrow exception to the general rule of
deference."). The Fourth Circuit's decision in Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir.
1992), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Adams v. Evatt, 511 U.S. 1001 (1994), suggests
that the exception can be a narrow one. The court of appeals, after all, refused to apply
the Evans standard to Adams since the government's case did not depend "completely"
on police testimony. See id. at 1317.
216. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 742. In his dissent, Judge Murnaghan concluded that the
court had wrongly given too much weight to the "general rule of deference" in failing to
permit an exception to that rule in cases that fit the facts of Evans. Id. at 749
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) ("To overrule Evans because it conflicts with the general rule
of deference is to ignore the sensitive balancing of interests that constitutional decision-
making almost inevitably requires."). The court, of course, rejected this contention,
stating, "[iln overruling Evans, we have confronted directly the 'sensitive balancing of
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dire proceedings into unnecessarily lengthy sessions in which trial
judges would have to ask jurors whether they would give heightened
credibility to "any identifiable class of witnesses that might
conceivably be thought by jurors to be inherently credible. 21 7
According to the court, there are "an abundance of occupations" that
jurors might find inherently credible.218 Yet since the court's
adoption of a per se rule in the 1970 case of United States v. Gore,
219
the Fourth Circuit has not been confronted with a case in which a
judge has refused to ask jurors about the credibility of testimony
from some other "inherently credible" class of witnesses.2°
The Lancaster court conceded that simply asking the jurors
whether they would attribute more credibility to police testimony
than to the testimony of others might be "the most efficient way to
accomplish the goal of an impartial jury. '' "l The court of appeals,
however, refused to "straightjacket the district court's discretion"
even if, ironically, the district court could be made to conduct voir
interests' that constitutional decision-making requires, and found that the balance weighs
in favor of restoring discretion in the handling of voir dire to the trial judge." Id. at 741.
217. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
21& Id at 741 n.5. At least one member of the court suggested that the defendant
might be a member of a group possibly thought inherently credible by jurors. In his
concurrence to the Fourth Circuit's original holding in Lancaster, Judge Luttig suggested
that, if the per se rule was not overruled, it should be extended to "require that trial
courts also ask each member of the venire whether he would 'give special credence and
weight to the word of [the criminal defendant] simply because of the fact that he [is the
criminal defendant].'" United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 897 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Luttig, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800, 806 (4th Cir. 1990),
overruled by United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)),
vacated, 96 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 967 (1997). The
court should permit such an inquiry, he argued, because "[a]t a minimum we should be
evenhanded in our pursuit of rules assertedly designed to ensure evenhandedness." Id.
(Luttig, J., concurring). The court of appeals sitting en banc also noted the possibility that
"even persons holding the 'occupation' of criminal defendant may be considered more
credible witnesses than law enforcement officers." Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 741 n.5.
219. 435 F.2d 1110, 1113 (4th Cir. 1970).
220. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 751 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 742. In Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931), the Supreme Court
noted with favor the following words from another court's opinion on voir dire inquiries
concerning racial prejudice:
"[T]o ask a person whether he is prejudiced or not against a party, and (if the
answer is affirmative), whether that prejudice is of such a character as would
lead him to deny the party a fair trial, is not only the simplest method of
ascertaining the state of his mind, but is, probably, the only sure method of
fathoming his thoughts and feelings."
Id. at 313-14 n.3 (quoting People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 350 (1855), but omitting a comma
following "and", and transposing the comma and parenthesis following "affirmative").
This logic also would appear to apply to voir dire concerning witnesses.
222. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 742.
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dire more efficiently and effectively under the Evans rule. Thus, in
Lancaster, the Fourth Circuit indicated that the general policy of
deference warranted greater consideration than concerns about
efficiency.'
The court of appeals believed that "there are many means by
which an impartial jury may be impaneled."' Accordingly, it was
not absolutely necessary to ask jurors a specific voir dire question
concerning the credibility of police-witness testimony. By
determining whether jurors had some association with law
enforcement personnel or agencies, asking the jurors generally if they
harbored "'preconceived ideas, prejudices, biases, or anything like
that,' "m and inquiring as to whether they would be prejudiced
against the defendants because the defendants were prisoners, the
trial court had, in the estimation of the Fourth Circuit, sufficiently
probed the jury for bias and did not need to ask the specific
requested question.26
Yet. some legal commentators believe that the failure to ask
specific questions concerning possible juror bias inevitably deprives a
party of a truly effective voir dire; they contend that general, vague
inquiries are less likely to elicit juror responses that might reveal
prejudice or bias.= Jurors may not realize that they are harboring a
223. Some, however, have viewed deferring to the trial court as a means of expediting
voir dire. See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System, The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 465-66 (1960) ("The
reasons for vesting the trial court with this discretion [over the conduct of voir dire] are
obviously, first, to see that the voir dire examination actually is effective in obtaining an
impartial jury, and second, to see that this result is obtained with reasonable
expedition.").
224. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 742.
225. IdL at 743 (quoting from the district court's jury instruction in Lancaster).
226. See id at 742-44.
227. See Valerie P. Hans, The Conduct of Voir Dire: A Psychological Analysis, 11
JUST. SYS. J. 40, 55 (1986) ("[Ejairly precise questions about a person's behavioral
intentions are better predictors of what the person will actually do than more general
questions about liking or affect."). One commentator has noted somewhat cynically that
[o]nce a person has been unsuccessful in avoiding jury duty he would probably
prefer being seated as a juror to spending his time in jury assembly rooms, so he
is not likely to volunteer information which might disqualify him, and he may
even lie in order to avoid being excused. A voir dire examination must be
thorough and probing to overcome a venireman's strong desire to conceal
disqualifying personal information.
Cooper, supra note 200, at 274-75; see also Bush, supra note 8, at 11 ("Jurors do not speak
out during voir dire.... [Judges] not receiving an answer, will continue on to the next
question without making any attempt to determine if one or more of the jurors desires to
answer the question but is acting hesitantly."); Spears, supra note 200, at 1521 ("Although
many courts have appeared satisfied with general questions, more detailed interrogation
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bias unless it is directly pointed out to them.2  Thus, without a
specific inquiry into an area of concern, a party likely will be unable
to determine whether a juror should be removed. 9
Since alternative methods employed by different judges may not
necessarily provide for an effective voir dire, some critics have
argued in favor of a more standardized approach to jury selection,
as well as a different standard of review for trial court decisions
regarding voir dire." One commentator has suggested that courts be
required to "permit inquiry into any area connected with (1) a
significant legal or factual aspect of the case, or (2) a conspicuous
is required if voir dire is not to be an empty formality.").
228. See Bush, supra note 8, at 13 ("The majority of potential jurors have little or no
personal experience in comprehending and expressing their own states of consciousness
.... "). It seems that jurors would be even less likely to recognize a potential bias
problem when they are unaware of who will be testifying at trial. Cf. Hans, supra note
227, at 55 ("It would be .. . fruitful to ask questions specifically related to details of the
case jurors are about to hear."). Judge Murnaghan addressed this issue in his dissent. He
criticized the majority's conclusion that asking whether jurors would give less credibility
to inmate testimony based on the inmate's status as a prisoner had "'the undeniable
effect of ... negat[ing] the possibility that members of the jury would give greater
credibility to the testimony of law enforcement officers solely because of their status.'"
Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 752 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 743). Judge
Murnaghan noted that
at the time the inmate-focused question was asked, the prospective jurors
presumably did not know that inmates and law enforcement officials would
together comprise the entire universe of witnesses. Consequently, they might
very well have inferred from the inmate question that they were not to assume
that inmates are more or less credible than average members of the larger
community, but yet also have believed that law enforcement officials are more
credible than average citizens.
Id. at 753 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
229. This is not to say that other sources of information regarding jurors are
unavailable to the parties. A party might be able to obtain the services of jury
investigators, social scientists, or psychologists to study the venire. See Barbara Allen
Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 558-61
(1975). However, these options are either unavailable or inadequate methods for finding
prejudices in cases in which a party cannot afford such assistance, see id. at 558, or when,
as in the cases at issue, a bias would be extremely difficult to detect from general juror
behavior.
230. See id. at 564 ("Voir dire generally should be governed by more standard and
detailed rules, rather than the present haphazard procedure, often varying from
courtroom to courtroom within a single building .... "); Spears, supra note 200, at 1515
("[A]t least three areas of voir dire require more standardized administration to assure
the effective exercise of peremptory challenges: (1) the content of questioning, (2) the
extent and form of questioning, and (3) the situations demanding individual interrogation
of jurors.").
231. See Cooper, supra note 200, at 272 ("The abuse of discretion standard affords
unusually weak protection to an important constitutional right."); Spears, supra note 200,
at 1522 ("[T]he appellate standard of review should be somewhat more stringent than at
present .... ).
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characteristic of a party or an important witness." A standard like
the one set forth in Evans requires that the trial court ask about
possible juror bias regarding a conspicuous characteristic of an
important witness2 3Y Where the government's case rests wholly on
testimony from police officers, the officers are critically important
witnesses and their testimony constitutes a significant tactical aspect
of the case.' The conspicuous characteristic of these witnesses is
their status as police officers. A majority of the federal courts of
appeals now require trial judges to permit inquiry into possible juror
bias toward police testimony25 The Fourth Circuit, of course, no
longer follows such a rule.
Voir dire is intended to provide parties with information upon
which to base their challenges of prospective jurors.2 Thus, the
information obtained through voir dire is vitally important to
ensuring that the parties will present their case before an impartial
jury27 As the Supreme Court has noted,
[v]oir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal
defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the
trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who
will not be able to impartially follow the court's instructions
and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.
Consequently, any limits on voir dire should be applied with
great care so that parties still get the information they need;
otherwise, their constitutional rights may be impinged.23 A trial
judge's decision to refuse to ask jurors a question that a party thinks
will be valuable to its exercise of voir dire should be scrutinized
carefully.
Yet in Lancaster, the Fourth Circuit rejected a rule that could
232. Spears, supra note 200, at 1521.
233. See United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800,809 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled by United
States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734,736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
234. See id. at 808-09.
235. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (listing cases).
236. See United States v. Brown, 799 F.2d 134,135 (4th Cir. 1986).
237. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,219 (1965) ("The function of the challenge is
not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that
the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed
before them, and not otherwise."), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
238. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182,188 (1981).
239. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1893) ("[A]ny system ... that




prevent judges from limiting voir dire significantly, a rule that the
Fourth Circuit had previously adopted.' The rule of United States v.
Evans called for a simple,241 efficient,242 and effective 3 approach to
discovering groundless bias in favor of police testimony. It did so
while still giving the trial court a sufficient amount of discretion over
the conduct of voir dire, providing that only under a narrow set of
circumstances could it be used to guide the judge's examination of
prospective jurors.2'
An important question remains, however: Has the Fourth
Circuit replaced the Evans rule with an equally or more effective
substitute? It does not appear as if the court has. The Lancaster rule
permits a court to avoid asking a question that directly addresses the
critical issue in certain cases. Instead, the court may ask jurors, who
presumably possess a limited amount of legal knowledge, whether
they know of any reason why they might be unfit to serve. When
coupled with other vague inquiries, which do not address the central
problem in a case like Lancaster, and a highly deferential standard on
appellate review, this approach to voir dire thwarts not only a party's
opportunity to examine thoroughly those individuals who will try her
case, but also any chance for reversal on the ground that the voir dire
was inadequate.
In United States v. Lancaster, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit rejected a long-accepted standard in favor of a new
standard that is less favorable to parties in both civil and criminal
240. See United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800, 806-08 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled by
United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734,736 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
241. Evans, after all, required that only one question be asked, and did not dictate
precisely what form the question should take. See id. at 806.
242. As has been noted, the majority appears to have conceded this point. See supra
text accompanying note 221; see also Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 751 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting)
("As I read them, our constitutional rights are not so weak and tenuous as to be worth
jettisoning when it takes as many as one or two minutes to ensure that they are not
violated.").
243. The Evans rule would seem to be more effective than other methods of
"ensuring" an impartial jury is seated, such as asking jurors during voir dire if they believe
that they can be impartial and/or giving jurors a general instruction on credibility prior to
their deliberations. See United States v. Martin, 507 F.2d 428, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1974)
("The sole purpose of voir dire is not to tell potential jurors that they are to be fair and
then ask them if they think they can be impartial. The defendant's proposed questions
were meant to elicit specific attitudes and prejudices."); see also supra notes 8, 238 and
accompanying text (reviewing the purposes of voirdire).
244. See supra notes 133-59 (discussing Evans); see also Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d
1306, 1317 (4th Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply Evans when the government's case did not
"completely depend[] on police testimony"), vacated on other grounds sub nor. Adams v.
Evatt, 511 U.S. 1001 (1994).
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cases that are essentially "swearing contests" between law
enforcement personnel and other witnesses. In practice, it would
appear that the Lancaster rule will limit the amount of critical
knowledge a party can discover about prospective jurors in such cases
and thereby infringe upon the constitutionally mandated right to an
impartial jury.
THOMAS G. HOOPER
